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CORPORATIONS-THE COURT'S

INDEPENDENT BUSINESS JUDGMENT WILL

BE APPLIED TO A DECISION OF A COMMITTEE OF DISINTERESTED
DIRECTORS TO DISMISS A DERIVATIVE SUIT ALLEGING A BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY A MAJORITY OF THE
CORPORATION'S

DIRECTORS

Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado (Del. 1981)
In 1975 William Maldonado, a shareholder of the Zapata Corporation (Zapata), brought a derivative action on behalf of Zapata in the
Court of Chancery of Delaware.1 Maldonado alleged that all members
of Zapata's board of directors 2 breached their fiduciary duties in approv1. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 780 (Del. 1981). In addition
to the Delaware action, Maldonado commenced an action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1977 against the same
defendants, excepting one, asserting claims under § 10(b), § 14(a) and § 7 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a), 78g (1976), as
well as the same common law claim raised in the Delaware action. Maldonado
v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 579
F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979), 477 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), sum. judgment
granted, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 729 (2d
Cir. 1982). Zapata's motion to stay the federal action pending the outcome
in the Delaware courts was denied. Maldonado v. Flynn, 477 F. Supp. 1007
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). Maldonado amended his complaint to eliminate the common
law claim then being pursued in Delaware and proceeded in the district court
with the alleged proxy rule violations. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). Following the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, the Second Circuit reversed in part and remanded the action to
the district court with instructions that the court should apply its own
independent business judgment to determine whether Zapata's motion to
terminate the suit should be granted, provided the district court found that the
suit was not barred by res judicata as a result of the settlement in a Texas
derivative suit. Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729, 731 (2d Cir. 1982), citing
Maher v. Zapata, No. H-79-234 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 1981).
The Texas action was brought by another shareholder of Zapata in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district
court denied Zapata's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in an opinion
consistent with that of the Delaware Vice Chancellor. Maher v. Zapata, 490
F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980), citing Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del.
Ch. 1980). The Texas action was settled. Maher v. Zapata, No. H-79-234
(S.D. Tex. June 12, 1981).
2. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 780 (Del. 1981). Named as
defendants in the suit were all eight directors of Zapata, four of whom were
officers, and two non-director officers. Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032,
1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Del. Ch.
1980). In 1971, the shareholders of Zapata ratified a stock option plan granting
the senior officers of the corporation an option to purchase shares of Zapata
at $12.15 a share, exercisable in five annual installments, the last date being
July 14, 1974. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980). In
June of 1974, when the market price of Zapata stock was between $18.00 and
$19.00, the board of directors decided that the corporation should make a
tender offer on the open market for its own shares at a price between $25.00
and $30.00. Id. On July 2, 1974, the management requested that the New
York Stock Exchange suspend trading in Zapata stock pending an important
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ing an acceleration of stock purchase options held by senior officers of
the company 3 and accordingly that demand on the corporation to institute suit was futile.4 In 1979, the board of directors of Zapata created
an "Independent Investigation Committee" (Committee) 5 consisting of
two outside directors who were appointed after the activities challenged
by Maldonado had taken place. 6 The Committee was to determine
whether the continuation of several derivative suits on behalf of Zapata
was inimical to the corporation's best interests. 7 Based upon the Committee's conclusion that continued maintenance of the actions was not in
Zapata's best interest, Zapata moved alternatively for dismissal of
Maldonado's suit or summary judgment.8
announcement. Id. On the same day, the board of directors voted to
accelerate the last exercise date of the option to July 2, 1974 and to permit
non-interest bearing loans to be made to the officers to enable them to pay
for the stock and to meet the tax liability they would incur upon the exercise
of their options. Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
3. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd, Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The options were exercised
on the accelerated date by the six officers, four of whom were also directors
of Zapata. Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
The board approved a tender offer for its own stock on July 3; the offer was
announced on July 8 and trading in Zapata stock resumed; on July 14, the
original exercise date, the price of Zapata stock was $24.50 a share. 413 A.2d
at 1254-55. The acceleration of the option's exercise date resulted in a lower
federal income tax liability for the officers, since taxable income resulting from
the exercise of these options was measured by the difference between the option
price and the market price at the time the option was exercised. Id. See also
I.R.C. § 83 (1976). Maldonado alleged that this lower federal income tax
liability for the officers resulted in a correspondingly lower deduction to Zapata,
with a loss to Zapata of a $430,000 net federal income tax benefit. Maldonado
v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. at 1035-36.
4. 430 A.2d at 780. Maldonado alleged in his complaint that prior
demand on the board was excused. 430 A.2d at 780. For a discussion of the
demand requirement, see notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text infra.
5. 430 A.2d at 781. The board of directors of a Delaware corporation is
empowered to delegate its authority to manage the corporation to a committee.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974). The Zapata committee was created
subsequent to a decision of the New York Court of Appeals shielding special
litigation committee decisions from judicial scrutiny. See Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). For a discussion of
Auerbach, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
6. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The two
outside directors were F. Arnold Daum, a partner in the law firm retained as
special counsel to the Committee, and George A. Lorenz, a businessman who
had been a shareholder and director of a firm acquired by Zapata in 1972. Id.
at 283. In 1979, when the Committee was created, four of the defendant
directors were no longer on the board. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779, 781 (Del. 1981).
7. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980). For a discussion of the various suits brought derivatively on behalf of Zapata, see
note 1 supra.
8. 430 A.2d at 781. Zapata also moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the two derivative suits that were being pursued in federal court. Id.
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Rejecting Zapata's claim that the Committee's conclusions were
shielded by the business judgment rule, 9 the Court of Chancery of
Delaware denied Zapata's alternative motions, finding that the business
judgment rule did not empower a committee of the board of directors
to compel a termination of a derivative suit and that, once the corporation has refused to act, a stockholder has an independent right to bring
suit on behalf of the corporation to remedy a breach of fiduciary duty
by the directors. 10 On an interlocutory appeal 1 by Zapata, the Supreme
Court of Delaware reversed, holding that a court, faced with a motion
to dismiss a properly instituted derivative suit, should apply its own
independent business judgment in reviewing the decision of an independent committee to dismiss the action. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
In Maldonado v. Flynn, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the motion, holding that under Delaware law the Committee's
decision was "insulated from shareholder challenge and judicial scrutiny" by
the "business judgment rule." 485 F. Supp. 274, 278-79, 284, 285. The
Second Circuit stayed the appeal, pending the Delaware Supreme Court's
determination of the issue of Delaware law. See 430 A.2d at 781. Finding
that under Delaware law the business judgment rule is purely defensive, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Zapata's
motion. Maher v. Zapata, 490 F. Supp. 348, 353 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
9. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255, 1257 (Del. Ch. 1980). Zapata
argued that absent self-dealing or the failure to exercise due care, the decisions of corporate directors are accorded a presumption of propriety by the
operation of the business judgment rule. Id. at 1255. For a discussion of the
business judgment rule, see notes 16-21 and accompanying text infra.
10. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1262-63 (Del. Ch. 1980). Having
determined that the business judgment rule merely provides a presumption of
regularity that attaches to decisions made by directors absent allegations of
self-dealing, lack of good faith, or failure to exercise due care, the Vice Chancellor concluded that the business judgment rule "is irrelevant to the issue of
whether the stockholders have an independent right to bring an action on
behalf of the corporation to rectify a breach of fiduciary duty where the
corporation itself refuses to act .... " Id. at 1263. Accord Abella v. Universal
Leaf Tobacco, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Va. 1980) (business judgment
rule irrelevant where plaintiff challenged directors' decision to resist takeover
and not committee's recommendation to dismiss suit).
11. 430 A.2d at 780. The purpose for allowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to advance the termination of litigation by resolving a
threshold question. DEL. Sup. CT. R. 42 (committee commentary). During
the pendency of an interlocutory appeal, proceedings in the trial court are not
automatically stayed.

DEL. SUP. CT. R. 42(d).

Between the time that the

interlocutory appeal was filed and the time that it was
Supreme Court of Delaware, the Chancery Court dismissed
"based on principles of res judicata, expressly conditioned
Circuit affirming the . . .New York District Court's decision
Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)]."

accepted by the
Maldonado's suit
upon the Second
[in Maldonado v.

430 A.2d at 781.

The appeal in

the Second Circuit was stayed pending the Delaware Supreme Court's resolution of the question of Delaware law. Id. This resulted in Zapata being
placed in a "procedural gridlock." Id. For a discussion of the New York
action, see note 1 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
Delaware Supreme Court's recognition of Zapata's predicament, see note 48
infra.
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It is a basic principle of corporate law that the board of directors,
and not the shareholders, is empowered to manage the business affairs
of the corporation. 12 Corporate directors, as fiduciaries, 13 owe the corporation duties of loyalty 14 and due care. 15 Generally, a court will not
12. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1980) ("except as may
be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation");
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1981) ("[s]ubject to any provision
in the certificate of incorporation"). See also 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §505 at 515 (rev. perm. ed. 1982); H.
HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 415 (1970); Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 80 n.41 (1967).
A corporation is a fictitious legal entity created by the sovereign. H.
HENN, supra, at 12.
Corporate attributes include the power to hold and
convey property; the power to sue and be sued; centralized management;
transferability of interest; perpetual existence; and limited liability. Id. at
109. While the directors are elected by the shareholders, they do not derive
their powers from them; directors receive their authority directly from the
state through the act of incorporation. 2 W. FLETCHER, supra, § 507 at 531.
The authority of the directors extends only to the "ordinary and regular"
business of the corporation, excluding any power to change its character or
to wind-up the corporation. Id. § 505 at 517.
13. See H. HENN, supra note 12, at 415. Corporate directors are fiduciaries
whose duties run primarily to the corporation. Id. at 415-16.
14. See Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96, 101 nn.26-27
(1980). A director's duty of loyalty requires that there be "no conflict between
duty and self-interest" which may result in the director's use of his position of
trust to further his own interests. Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d
503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939). When an action is brought to challenge actions of
a director, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defendantdirector breached his duty to the corporation by acting in his own self-interest.
See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 116
(1979). Once a breach of the duty of loyalty has been demonstrated the
defense of the business judgment rule is no longer available to the director,
who then bears the burden of showing the intrinsic fairness of the transaction.
See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 979, 980 (Del. 1977) ("it is within
the responsibility of an equity court to scrutinize a corporate act when it is
alleged that its purpose violates the fiduciary duty owed to minority stockholders"); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (shareholder ratification of interested director transaction merely means that the transaction
cannot be voided solely because of such interest; the court retains the power
to scrutinize the fairness of the transaction); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (interested directors
bear the burden of showing the entire fairness of the transaction); Tanzer v.
International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 386 (Del. Ch. 1979) (even where
the majority has a bona fide business purpose for its action, it bears the burden
of proving "entire fairness" to the minority). Compare Puma v. Marriott, 283
A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971) (where interested directors were not on both sides of
the transaction the decision was protected by the business judgment rule).
Under a Delaware statutory provision, transactions involving interested directors
will not be voided solely because of the taint of self-interest, if such self-interest
is disclosed to the board, a committee of the board, or the shareholders, and
the transaction is approved by the board, the committee, or the shareholders;
or if the transaction is fair to the corporation and is authorized or ratified by
the board or the shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974).
15. See Dent, supra note 14, at 101 nn.26-27. The duty of due care, requiring that a director act with ordinary prudence, is judged by negligence
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examine management decisions made by directors on the ground that
"the substitution of someone else's business judgment for that of the directors 'is no business for any court to follow.' " 10 The protection of
this "business judgment rule" extends to decisions made in good faith 17
and in the best interests of the corporation Is and includes the decision
standards. See, e.g., Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880) (due to precarious
financial condition of bank, expenditure for new building was found to be
reckless and unreasonable). See also MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT, § 35 (1971); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW §717 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). Commentators have criticized any requirement of a finding of gross negligence for the imposition of
liability. See Arsht, supra note 14, at 101-08; Dent, supra note 14, at 101
n.26. Once a lack of reasonable diligence in the making of a business decision
has been demonstrated the business judgment rule defense becomes inapplicable. See, e.g., Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d
487, 492-93 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct.
1944). See also Arsht, supra note 14, at 130.
16. Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 813, 383 N.Y.S.2d
807, 811 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976),
quoting Holmes v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 84 Misc. 278, 283, 147 N.Y.S. 104, 107
(1914). See also Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 221 A.2d 487 (Sup. Ct.
1966). The Warshaw court stated that:
In the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the directors
or of a gross abuse of discretion the business judgment of the
directors will not be interfered with by the courts. . . . The acts of
directors are presumptively acts taken in good faith and inspired for
the best interests of the corporation, and a . . . stockholder who
challenges their bona fides of purpose has the burden of proof.
Id. at 157-58, 221 A.2d at 492-93.
The underlying purpose of the business judgment rule is to encourage
qualified persons to serve as directors by protecting them from liability for
mere mistakes of judgment when they have acted as prudent persons would
have in the same situation. Arsht, supra note 14, at 97, quoting Percy v.
Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829). See also Dent, supra note 14,
at 135.
17. A good faith decision is one made with loyalty to the corporation and
with due care. See H. HENN, supra note 12, at 433; Dent, supra note 14, at
101. For discussions of the directors' duties of loyalty and due care, see notes
14 & 15 supra.
18. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)
(where parent received nothing from subsidiary to exclusion of subsidiary's
minority shareholders there is no self-dealing and business judgment rule protects directors' decision to declare dividend from judicial review); Warshaw v.
Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (interlocking directors of personal holding company and its subsidiary exercised
reasonable business judgment in selling holding company's stock subscription
rights in its subsidiary rather than passing them on to holding company stockholders); Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 426, 140 A. 264,
267 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (court would not interfere with board of directors' authority
to set the price of unissued stock absent a showing of selfish motive on the
part of the directors; honest mistake of judgment not reviewable); Pollitz v.
Wabash R. R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (1912) (directors'
"honest and unselfish" management decisions may not be questioned even
where they prove to be "unwise or inexpedient"); Casey v. Woodruff, 49
N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (a court will not interfere with decisions
reached as a result of reasonable diligence and the exercise of honest, unbiased
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of whether to pursue a corporate cause of action.19 The rule, however,
will not shield decisions where it appears that the directors have not
acted with scrupulous loyalty to the corporation; 20 these decisions, un21
protected by the business judgment rule, may be scrutinized by a court.
When a stockholder wishes to challenge decisions made by the
directors as being in breach of their fiduciary duties, his recourse is to
judgment). See also 2 W. FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 505 at 516-17; H. HENN,
supra note 12, at 482-83; Arsht, supra note 14, at 111-12.
19. See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244
U.S. 261 (1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455
(1903); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Ash v. International Business
Machs. Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966);
Gall v. Exxon, 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276
N.Y. 215, 11 N.E.2d 883 (1937). See also Dent, supra note 14, at 98 n.14
("The power to manage corporate business usually includes the power to
determine whether the corporation shall sue for redress of a wrong it is alleged
to have suffered."); Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in
Stockholders Derivative Actions, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 168, 171 (1976) (decision to
bring an action on behalf of the corporation is a management decision which
arises in controlling the business affairs of the corporation and is entrusted to
the board of directors).
In Ash v. International Business Machs. Inc., the plaintiff-stockholder attempted to pursue his corporation's antitrust claim under the Clayton Act by
enjoining a competitor from acquiring another corporation, where the result
of the acquisition, was alleged to be a lessening of competition. 353 F.2d at
492. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 25, 26 (1976). The directors refused to bring suit and
the court denied plaintiff's claim of standing to sue finding that "nothing
[was] pleaded or even suggested to indicate that the refusal of the directors to
sue was . . . anything worse than unsound business judgment honestly
exercised in the corporate interest." Id.
The protection of the business judgment rule extends to the settlement
of derivative suits by directors, although such settlements require the approval
of the court. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. Where the directors have exercised
honest business discretion, they will not be held responsible for mistakes in
judgment and the court will not interfere with the settlement. Perrine v.
Pennroad, 28 Del. Ch. 342, 43 A.2d 721 (Ch. 1945); aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47
A.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1947), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947). However, "[i]n
determining whether or not to approve a proposed settlement of a derivative
stockholder's action [when directors are on both sides of the transaction], the
Court of Chancery is called upon to exercise its own business judgment."
Neponsit Inv. Co. v. Abramson, 405 A.2d 97, 100 (Del. 1979). Cf. Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Sup. Ct. 1952)
(where parent and subsidiary have interlocking directors, merger of the two
corporations will be scrutinized by the court for entire fairness).
20. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct.
1939) (director's diversion of a corporate opportunity to his own benefit found
to be breach of duty of loyalty); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas 8: Elec. Co.,
224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918) (contract between two corporations with
common director voidable where director, seeking to benefit himself, did not
disclose the unfairness of the contract to one of the corporations),
21. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (parentsubsidiary merger); Flieger v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (diversion
of corporate opportunity); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293,
93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (parent-subsidiary merger). See also H. HENN,
supra note 12, at 459.
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bring suit derivatively on behalf of the corporation.2 2 Under Delaware
law, a stockholder is permitted to conduct derivative litigation when
"material corporate rights would not otherwise be protected." 23 A derivative action may be brought either to enforce a claim of the corporation against a third party 24 or to hold the directors liable to the corporation for an injury allegedly caused by them.2 5
22. Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 441, 141 A. 277, 281-82 (Sup. Ct.

1927). The derivative suit is a means developed in equity of preventing abuse
by corporate management; it allows shareholders to enforce managerial responsibility without questioning the underlying managerial power. Prunty,
The Shareholder's Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV.
980, 992-93 (1957). The derivative suit redresses two wrongs to the corporation:
the failure of the directors to bring suit and the injury to the corporation
committed by those allegedly liable to it. See H. HENN, supra note 12, at
756 n.l. See also Cantor v. Sachs, 18 Del. Ch. 359, 365, 162 A. 73, 76 (Ch.
1932); E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 484 (1972); Note,

Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit,
73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748 (1960). Since the cause of action belongs to the
corporation, any recovery obtained as a result of a derivative action likewise
belongs to the corporation. See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 253-54,
2 A.2d 904, 912-13 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 32 Del. Ch.
18, 25, 78 A.2d 473, 476 (Ch. 1951); Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting
Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909), afJ'd, 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
But see Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (minority shareholder plaintiff allowed pro rata recovery where majority shareholder would
have been unjustly enriched by a corporate recovery).
23. Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 442, 141 A. 277, 282 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
In Sohland the plaintiff's demand on the board was refused, but because the
directors had taken part in the challenged issuance of stock, the court questioned whether the directors could be expected to institute suit, or, if they did,
whether they would be the proper parties to conduct the suit. The court
indicated that if demand had not been made, this would have been a proper
case for its excuse. Id. at 442-43, 141 A. at 282. Accordingly, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the individual defendant's
motion to dismiss. Id. at 454, 141 A. at 287.
24. See, e.g., United Copper Sec. v, Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S.
261 (1917) (directors refused to sue a third party for damages under the
Sherman Antitrust Act); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881) (derivative suit
used in attempt to invoke diversity jurisdiction of federal courts to enjoin
City of Oakland from free use of corporation's water supply); Miller v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974) (corporation's failure to
sue Democratic National Committee for a debt would have resulted in an
illegal campaign contribution); Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277.
(Sup. Ct. 1927) (interested majority of directors refused to institute suit to
compel cancellation of stock issued to former director).
25. See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980) (directors
accused of proxy violations for failure to disclose change made in employee
stock option plans); Gall v. Exxon, 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (claim
that illegal foreign payments were approved by the directors); Taormina v.
Taormina Corp., 32 Del. Ch. 18, 78 A.2d 473 (Ch. 1951) (directors alleged to
have illegally diverted corporate profits); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (charge that directors breached their
fiduciary duties by the payment of bribes). Most derivative suits are brought
against directors, officers or controlling persons. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN
PERSPECTIVE

401 (1976).
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The danger that frivolous derivative suits may be brought has
prompted legislatures to impose certain restrictions on instituting shareholders' actions.26 One of these restrictions requires that a stockholder
bringing suit on the corporation's behalf must first make a demand upon
the board of directors to initiate the action. 27 If demand is refused, a
stockholder may proceed with the action only upon a showing that the
refusal was wrongful. 28 However, the requirement of making a demand
26. See H. HENN, supra note 12, at 752-55. See also Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (derivative suit brought not to
benefit the corporation but to benefit the plaintiff's attorney by the award of
a fee is a nuisance action or "strike suit"). The restrictions upon the initiation
of derivative suits include the requirement that the plaintiff must have been
the owner of shares of the corporation at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 327 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKinney 1963). See also Bangor
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
In addition, the stockholder plaintiff is required to make demand upon the
board of directors to bring suit or give reasons why such demand was not
made. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKinney
1963). For a discussion of the demand requirement, see note 27 and accompanying text infra. Some jurisdictions require the plaintiff to post security
for the expenses the corporation will incur during the litigation; the corporation's entitlement to the fund is determined by the court. See, e.g., CAL. GEN.
CORP. LAW § 800 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp.
1981-82); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §433 (Purdon 1967). See also A. CONARD,
supra note 25, at 400. Delaware does not have a security for costs requirement.
See H. HENN, supra note 12, at 781 n.1. Despite the potential for "strike
suits," it is acknowledged that in the corporate system, where ownership and
control are separated, the derivative suit remains an important method by
which stockholders can prevent abuses of managerial authority. Dykstra,
supra note 12, at 81-82.
27. See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881); FED. R. Civ.
P. 23.1; CAL. GEN. CORP. LAW §800(b)(2) (West 1977); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1;
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 1963). The shareholder's complaint
must state "the efforts ... made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires
from the directors . . . and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or
for not making the effort." DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. The purpose of the demand
requirement is to allow the board of directors to assess the situation, to decide
whether litigation is appropriate, and, if it is, to conduct the litigation. See
Comment, supra note 19, at 171-72. By ensuring that intracorporate remedies
are exhausted first, the courts can avoid the burden of unnecessary litigation
and the corporation may be able to rid itself of nuisance litigation. Id. See
also H. HENN, supra note 12, at 770; Kim, The Demand on Directors Requirement and the Business Judgment Rule in the Shareholder Derivative
Suit: An Alternative Framework, 6 J. CORP. L. 511, 512 (1981). For a discussion of nuisance actions, see note 26 and accompanying text supra.
28. See Comment, supra note 19, at 193-98 and cases cited therein. The
directors' refusal may be wrongful when the directors are controlled by the
alleged wrongdoer, are interested in the challenged transaction, have participated in an injurious or illegal transaction, or have refused to assert a
cause of action where the refusal itself amounts to negligence or is an illegal
act. Id. See also Dent, supra note 14, at 102.
Where the board of director's refusal is not wrongful the derivative action
will be dismissed. See, e.g., Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259,
275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Ash v. International
Business Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
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may be excused as futile where a majority of the directors are accused
of the wrongdoing.2
927 (1966); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957), on remand from,
554 U.S. 114 (1957); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966).
In Swanson, "several" members of the board were charged with fraudulent
conspiracy, however, the court found that the plaintiff had not shown that at
the time demand was made a majority of the board was either under the
control of the wrongdoers or had engaged in any misconduct themselves. 249
F.2d at 856 & n.l. As a result, the board, which had rejected plaintiff's demand
to bring suit, was allowed to terminate the litigation. Id. at 858.
29. See, e.g., Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 441, 141 A. 277, 281-82
(Sup. Ct. 1927); Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 103, 107-08, 174 A.2d
696, 699-700 (Ch. 1961); Ainscow v. Sanitary Co. of Amer., 21 Del. Ch. 35,
36-37, 180 A. 614, 615 (Ch. 1935); McKee v. Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, 86, 156
A. 191, 193 (Ch. 1931). The futility of making demand arises from the theory
that the directors would not choose to institute a suit against themselves. See
Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 378-79, 329 N.E.2d 180, 187, 368 N.Y.S.2d
497, 505 (1975). See also Comment, supra note 19, at 175-76.
In McKee v. Rogers, where a stockholder sought the collection of a judgment obtained in an earlier suit brought to redress breaches of fiduciary duty
by the corporation's former president, the court stated that:
[A] stockholder may sue in equity in his derivative right to assert a
cause of action in behalf of the corporation, without prior demand
upon the directors to sue, when it is apparent that a demand would
be futile, that the officers are under an influence that sterilizes discretion and could not be proper persons to conduct the litigation.
18 Del. Ch. at 86, 156 A. at 193. See also E. FOLK, supra note 22, at 489.
Where the majority of directors have merely acquiesced in the challenged
decision and only a minority of the defendant directors were actually selfinterested, demand may not be excused. See In re Kauffman Mutual Fund
Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (Ist Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 857 (1973). In
Kauflman, a shareholder in four mutual funds brought a derivative suit against
the directors and investment advisors of the funds alleging a conspiracy to set
excessive management fees. 479 F.2d at 261. Since fewer than a majority of
the funds' directors were affiliated with the investment advisors, the court held
that mere approval of the challenged action, absent self-interest, was insufficient to excuse demand. Id. at 265. However, the court went on to note
that:
If a director goes along with a colleague in an act on its face
advantageous only to that colleague and not to the corporation, this
in itself is a circumstance . . . supporting the claim that he is under
that colleague's control. It may be assumed that he would remain so
when the directorate votes on plaintiff's demand ...
Id.
In contrast with Kauffman, the New York Court of Appeals held that
demand was excused where disinterested directors approved transactions benefiting self-dealing directors. Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 379-81, 329
N.E.2d 180, 187-88, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 506-08 (1975). The plaintiff in Barr, a
shareholder of a company which was a takeover target, accused the self-dealing
directors of, inter alia, approving a tender offer for personal gain, approving
improvident employment contracts of fellow directors, and changing the
terms of a merger proposal to the detriment of the corporation. Id. at 375-76,
329 N.E.2d at 184, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 502-03. However, in light of New York's
adoption of the committee dismissal technique in Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) it is questionable whether
any excuse for not making a demand on the directors now exists in that
jurisdiction. For a discussion of Auerbach v. Bennett, see notes 37-40 and
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In order to invoke the protection of the business judgment rule
when a majority of the directors are implicated in the wrongdoing, a
technique has been developed where the accused majority of the board
appoints a committee of "disinterested" directors who will decide
whether it is in the best interests of the corporation to pursue the derivative action against the accused directors.3 0 Statutes enacted in several
states permit the board of directors to delegate its decision making
authority to a committee.3 ' The courts have extended the protection
accompanying text infra. See also Note, The Business Judgment Rule Shields
the Good Faith Decision of Disinterested Directors to Terminate a Derivative
Suit Against the Corporation's Directors, 25 VILL. L. REV. 551, 564 (1980).
30. See, eg., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (litigation committee determined suit to
compel repayment of penalties levied against corporation as a result of illegal
foreign payments not in corporation's best interest; corporation's motion for
summary judgment granted); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980) (litigation committee determined suit challenging revision of stock options to benefit directors not in corporation's best
interest; action dismissed); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., 495 F.
Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980) (litigation committee determined maintenance of
suit claiming directors breached duty in expending corporate funds to oppose
takeover not in corporation's best interest; corporation's motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment denied); Maher v. Zapata, 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(litigation committee determined litigation concerning revision of stock options
not in corporation's best interest; corporation's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment denied); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982) (litigation committee determined
litigation over revision of stock options not in corporation's best interest;
summary dismissal granted); Siegal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(control of board by defendant directors does not render demand futile since
decision to proceed with derivative litigation may be made by independent
directors); Gall v. Exxon, 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (litigation committee could terminate suit based upon allegations of foreign bribery if it
determined suit not in corporation's best interests; summary judgment denied
pending discovery as to independence of committee members); Lasker v. Burks,
404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,
441 U.S. 471 (1979) (allegation of negligence and/or acts of self-interest; independent directors' motion to dismiss granted). Compare Abramowitz v. Posner,
513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982) (minority
of directors accused of diverting corporate funds to personal use; independent
board committee recommended no legal action; suit dismissed); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (allegation
of payment of bribes and kickbacks by a minority of the board; committee's
good faith decision not to pursue litigation shielded from judicial scrutiny by
business judgment rule). See also Brown & Phillips, The Business Judgment
Rule: Burks v. Lasker and Other Recent Developments, 6 J. CORP. L. 453
(1981); Johnson, The Business Judgment Rule: A Review of Its Application
to the Problem of Illegal Foreign Payments, 6 J. CORP. L. 481 (1981); Note,
supra note 29.
31. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974) (a committee of the
board may exercise the power and authority of the board of directors in the
management of the business affairs of the corporation, excepting the power
to amend the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws, adopting agreement of
merger or sale of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets, or recommending dissolution). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 6-9 (West Supp. 198182); N.Y. Bus. CoP. LAW § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
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of the business judgment rule to the decisions of these independent
committees.3 2 For example, in Gall v. Exxon,33 the board established a
special litigation committee composed of directors appointed to the
34
board after the action challenged by the derivative suit had taken place.
The plaintiff-stockholder claimed that payments approved by a majority
of the directors and made to Italian political parties were a waste of
corporate assets, and that failure to disclose the payments violated the
proxy requirements of federal securities law.3 5 The District Court for
the Southern District of New York concluded that the independent
committee could terminate the derivative suit if it concluded that termination was in the corporation's best interest.86 Three years after Gall,
32. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
33. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (applying New Jersey law). See also
Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). In Lasker, a majority of the directors

were accused of negligent and fraudulent acts in connection with the corporation's purchase of Penn Central notes shortly before Penn Central filed a
petition for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act. 404 F. Supp. at 1174-75.

The full board decided that since a quorum could be obtained, consisting of

the non-defendant directors, those directors would determine what position to
take on the derivative litigation. Id. at 1175 n.l. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that if "the minority directors were truly
disinterested and independent" their motion to dismiss the action would be
granted. Id. at 1180. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that federal law
governed the fiduciary duties of the directors of investment companies and that
the decision of a disinterested minority of the board could not be used to
terminate a nonfrivolous derivative suit. 567 F.2d at 1212. In reversing the
Second Circuit's decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the
power of independent directors to cause dismissal of a derivative suit is a
question of state law. 441 U.S. at 480. The Supreme Court stated that where
disinterested directors of a corporation seek the dismissal of derivative suits
alleging violations of federal law, a court must first determine whether under
the relevant state law the business judgment rule would protect the directors'
decision from judicial scrutiny. Id. The Court reasoned that state law is
controlling because corporations are created under state statutes and the
powers of corporate management are determined under the same statutes.
Id. at 478. A court must next determine whether dismissal is consistent with
the underlying policy of the applicable federal law. Id. at 480. The Lasker

Court held that dismissal was consistent with the Investment Company Act.

Id. To determine the underlying policy of the law, the Court looked to the
legislative history of the Act and concluded that "Congress entrusted to the
independent directors of investment companies .. . the primary responsibility
for looking after the interests of the funds' shareholders" and that in doing
so the directors could reasonably determine that it was not in the best interests
of the corporation to sue. Id. at 485.
34. Id. at 510 n.2. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-9 (West Supp. 1981-82)
(directorial authority may be delegated to a committee).
35. 418 F. Supp. at 509. The Gall defendants were alleged to have
violated § 13(a) and § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1976). 418 F. Supp. at 509.
36. 418 F. Supp. at 516-19. The court stated: "Such a determination, like
any other business decision, must be made by the corporate directors in the
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the New York Court of Appeals, in Auerbach v. Bennett,37 held that a
special litigation committee's good faith decision not to continue a derivative suit was shielded from judicial scrutiny by the business judgment doctrine. 38 In applying New York law, the Auerbach court
reasoned that "[t]o permit judicial probing" into the substance of the
committee's decision" would . . . emasculate the business judgment
doctrine." 39 However, the court held that an inquiry into the "disinterested independence" of the committee members and into the "adequacy and appropriateness of the committee's investigative procedures"
40
was not foreclosed by the business judgment rule.
Subsequent to Auerbach and Gall, several federal courts, interpreting Delaware law, concluded that Delaware courts would hold that
the business judgment rule protects from judicial scrutiny the decision
of a committee of independent and disinterested directors to terminate
exercise of their sound business judgment." Id. at 518. The grant of the
corporation's motion for summary judgment was withheld pending discovery
as to the disinterestedness of the committee members. Id. at 519-20.
37. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), noted in 25
VILL. L. REV. 551 (1980). The plaintiff-stockholder in Auerbach alleged that
four members of the fifteen member board of General Telephone & Electronics
Corporation (GTE) had breached their fiduciary duties by paying bribes and
kickbacks totalling more than eleven million dollars to foreign officials. Id.
at 625, 631, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 1001, 419 N.Y.S. at 923, 927. For a discussion
of other cases dealing with questionable foreign payments as a breach of
directorial duty, see note 64 infra.
38. 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The
Auerbach decision has been followed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York in a connected case. Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp.,
74 A.D.2d 762, 425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1980) (stockholder alleged waste of corporate
assets resulting from questionable payments made to foreign officials; business
judgment rule barred judicial inquiry into special litigation committee's decision not to pursue derivative suits).
39. 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court
reasoned that in arriving at its decision not to pursue the litigation the committee would have had to weigh and balance the "legal, ethical, commercial,
promotional, public relations [and fiscal] factors familiar to the resolution of
most corporate problems . . . ; [i]nquiry into such matters would go to
the very core of the business judgment made by the committee." Id. at 633-34,
393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court opined that the protection
of the business judgment doctrine exists because the courts are "ill equipped"
to evaluate the kinds of business decisions that corporate directors are
"peculiarly qualif[ied]" to make. Id. at 630-31, 393 N.E.2d at 1000,
419
N.Y.S.2d at 926-27. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see notes
16-21 and accompanying text supra.
40. Id. at 631, 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The
court stated that committee members would be required to show that they
conducted a reasonably complete investigation in good faith. Id. at 634, 393
N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929. The Auerbach committee met this
burden by engaging special counsel, reviewing the results of a preliminary
investigation, and interviewing the implicated directors and the corporation's
outside auditors. Id. at 635, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929-30.
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In Abbey v. Control Data Corporation,42 the

Eighth Circuit, relying upon prior Delaware cases, reasoned that the
deference given business decisions of independent directors also protects
the decision of an independent minority of the board to terminate
litigation. 4 Relying in part upon the Delaware statutes governing delegation of power to committees and transactions involving interested
directors, 44 the District Court for the Southern District of New York in
41. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728-30 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp.
120, 125-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Maldonado v.
Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 278-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 729
(2d Cir. 1982); Siegal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Contra
Maher v. Zapata, 490 F. Supp. 348, 351-53 (S.D. Tex. 1980). For a discussion
of Maldonado v. Flynn and Maher v. Zapata, both arising from the same facts
as the instant case, see note 1 supra.
In Siegal v. Merrick, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, construing Delaware law, held that even though the defendant directors
controlled the board, demand was not futile since the board could establish an
independent committee of those directors who would be protected by the
business judgment rule. 84 F.R.D. at 110, citing Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d
693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971).
The Ninth Circuit, construing California law, noted the similarity be-

tween the Delaware and California statutes authorizing board committees. See
Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869
(1980). Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West 1977) with DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974). In Lewis, the stockholder claimed that the board
granted new stock options which allegedly benefited the defendant directors
and that the manner of their issuance violated the federal security laws. 615
F.2d at 780. The court granted the corporation's motion to dismiss based

upon the good faith determination of a special litigation committee that the
suit was not in the corporation's best interest. Id. at 783, citing Abbey v.
Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980). For a
discussion of the Delaware statute, see note 31 supra.
42. 603 F.2d 724, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980). In Abbey, plaintiffs
sought to compel officers and directors of Control Data Corporation (CDC) to
repay the corporation for criminal and civil penalties levied against CDC
because of illegal foreign payments allegedly made under the direction of the
individual defendants. 603 F.2d at 726. A special litigation committee composed of seven non-employee directors of CDC, none of whom were defendants,
determined that legal action would not be in the best interest of the corporation. Id. at 727. At the direction of the committee, CDC's counsel moved
for summary judgment. Id. The District Court for the District of Minnesota
granted summary judgment. Id. at 726 n.l, 727. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 732.
43. 603 F.2d at 729, citing Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (grant of stock options protected by business judgment rule
where disinterested majority of the board concluded that the plan was in the
corporation's best interest); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971)
(where the majority of the board was disinterested and not under control of
the interested minority, the business judgment rule protected the board's decision to purchase stock in six corporations in exchange for its own stock).
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(c), 144 (1974). For a discussion of the
delegation of authority to committees of directors under corporate statutes, see
note 31 supra. For a discussion of the interested director statute, see note
14 supra.
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A bramowitz v. Posner,45 found that the disinterested directors were empowered to act for the corporation 46 and concluded that to deny the
independent directors the power to dismiss derivative litigation would
be to hold "that a corporation is powerless to act, through independent
members, whenever it has among its body an interested director." 47
Against this background, the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed
the issue of whether a committee of independent directors has the power
to cause dismissal of litigation brought by a stockholder in a case where
demand has properly been excused. 48 Because the lower court had concluded that a stockholder has an independent right to maintain deriva45. 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982).
In Abramowitz, five of the seventeen board members of NVF Company (NVF),
a Delaware corporation, were accused of misusing corporate funds to pay
personal expenses and of not disclosing the misappropriations in reports filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue
Service, and the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 121. Action taken by the
SEC resulted in a consent judgment against the defendants for $600,000.00.
Id. at 122. Pursuant to the terms of the consent judgment, two independent
directors were appointed to the board. Id. at 123. An audit committee was
formed composed of these two directors, and a third director who had been
on NVF's board at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. Id. The committee
recommended that the corporation seek reimbursement from the defendants
for $1,021,445.00, in addition to the $600,000.00 judgment, but that the corporation take no legal action against the defendants unless they failed to
reimburse NVF. Id. at 123. As a result of the committee's decision and the
corporation's subsequent receipt of the reimbursement, the board of directorswith the defendants abstaining-voted to reject the plaintiff stockholder's demand that NVF bring suit. Id. at 124-25. The district court dismissed the suit.
Id. at 129. On appeal to the Second Circuit, following the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, the decision of the district
court was affirmed. Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982). The
Second Circuit distinguished Abramowitz from Zapata in that the former was
a case where demand was not excused, but was made and refused. Id. at 1030.
The Abramowitz court deferred to the directors' business judgment and held
that absent a showing of a wrongful refusal the stockholder was "simply without legal ability to initiate a derivative action." For a discussion of "wrongful
refusal," see note 28 and accompanying text supra.
46. 513 F. Supp. at 127-129. For a discussion of the facts of Abramowitz,
see note 45 supra.
47. 513 F. Supp. at 133. For a discussion of the general authority of
directors, see notes 12-19 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
interested director transactions, see notes 14 & 20 supra.
48. 430 A.2d at 782. The court found this question to be one of first
impression in Delaware. Id. at 783. Before reaching the merits, Justice
Quillen, writing for a unanimous court, acknowledged the court's responsibility
to resolve the issue of Delaware law because of the "procedural gridlock" in
which Zapata had been left by the dismissal of Maldonado's cause of action on
res judicata principles. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980).
The res judicata dismissal followed the Vice Chancellor's denial of Zapata's
motion to dismiss on the basis of the special litigation committee's determination; dismissal was expressly conditioned upon the decision of the Second
Circuit in Maldonado v. Flynn. However, Maldonado's appeal to the Second
Circuit was stayed pending the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in
the instant case. 430 A.2d at 781. For a discussion of the Second Circuit
action, see note I supra.
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tive litigation, the Zapata court found that the power of a committee of
the board to cause derivative litigation to be dismissed, rather than the
application of the business judgment rule to the Committee's decision
to terminate the action, was the focus of the case.4 9 The court determined that this focus required an analysis of three aspects of a corporation's motion to dismiss a derivative suit: the shareholder's right to
maintain a derivative action; the board's power to dismiss the action or
to delegate this authority to a committee of the board; and the role of
the trial court in resolving the conflict between the stockholder and the
directors. 50
Turning to the Vice Chancellor's determination that a stockholder
has an independent right to continue a derivative suit over the corporation's objection, the court distinguished the stockholder's right to institute a derivative action from the right to continue that suit.0 ' The
court rejected the Vice Chancellor's determination, concluding that an
inflexible rule that placed sole control of the corporate action in the
hands of the litigating stockholders throughout the entire litigation
would serve the interests of only one person or group to the exclusion
52
of all others.
Having found that the stockholder does not have an absolute power
to continue the suit in the face of the corporation's desire to terminate,
the Zapata court concluded that the board's managerial power encompasses litigation decisions 11 and that this power can be delegated to a
49. 430 A.2d at 782. The Supreme Court agreed with the Vice Chancellor
that the business judgment rule is not a source of directorial power; the Zapata
court stated that the business judgment rule is a judicial creation which insulates the directors from liability when they have exercised their statutory
authority. Id. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see notes 16-21
and accompanying text supra.
50. 430 A.2d at 782.
51. Id. at 783-84. The Supreme Court found that Sohland v. Baker, relied
upon by the lower court, did not create a stockholder's right, where demand
is excused, to continue litigation after a corporation's decision to terminate, but
merely affirmed the right to initiate a derivative suit. Id. at 783, citing Sohland
v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1927). In addition, while the
board in Sohland refused to assert the cause of action, it authorized payment of
the plaintiff's attorney's fees and it was not the board but the individual defendant, a former board member, who challenged the plaintiff's right to bring
the suit. 430 A.2d at 783.
52. Id. at 784-85.
53. 430 A.2d 782. The Zapata court affirmed the general rule that "a
stockholder cannot be permitted . . . to invade the discretionary field committed to the judgment of the directors and sue in the corporation's behalf
when the managing body refuses." Id. at 783, quoting McKee v. Rogers, 18
Del. Ch. 81, 85-86, 156 A. 191, 193 (Ch. 1931).
The court found that there are two exceptions to the board's exercise of
this power. 1) In cases where demand has been made upon the board to
institute the litigation and the board has refused, the board's decision will not
be respected by the court if it is found to be wrongful and the stockholder
plaintiff may then initiate the action. 430 A.2d at 784. The court defined a
wrongful refusal as one which was itself a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 783.
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committee formed pursuant to the Delaware statute. 54
Having concluded that a committee of disinterested directors could
act for the corporation in moving to dismiss derivative litigation, 55 the
Zapata court next addressed the role of a court in adjusting the conflicting claims of the stockholder and the board of directors. 6 The
court viewed its task as preserving the efficacy of the derivative suit as
an "intra-corporate means of policing boards of directors" 57 while not
disabling the corporation from ridding itself of "meritless or harmful
litigation and strike suits." 58 The court rejected the use of the business
judgment rule to restrict the court to an inquiry into only the independence and good faith of the committee members and the reasonableness of their investigation, while shielding the substance of the committee's decision from stockholder challenge and judicial scrutiny. 59
The Zapata court instead selected a "middle course" requiring the court
to exercise its independent discretion in evaluating the litigation. 60
However, the court reasoned that even in these cases the board retains its
power to conduct or terminate corporate litigation. Id. at 786. The court
opined that where the board's refusal has been found to be wrongful the board
remains empowered to decide but its conclusion will not be respected. Id.
2) Where demand has been excused the board retains its statutory powers but
its members are disqualified from making the decision. Id. Therefore, despite
the fact that demand on the board was excused as futile, due to the presence
of self-interested board members, the court concluded that Zapata's board had
the power to terminate the litigation although its members could not make
the decision themselves. Id. For a discussion of demand and refusal, see notes
27-29 and accompanying text supra.
54. 430 A.2d at 785. The court based its conclusion upon the express,
statutory power to delegate decision-making authority to a committee and by
an analogy to the statutory authority of disinterested directors to act for the
board in transactions in which some board members have an interest. Id. at
785-86. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(c), 144 (1974). For discussion
of these code sections, see notes 31 & 14 supra.
55. 430 A.2d at 786.
56. Id.
57. Id. For a discussion of the derivative suit as a policing mechanism,
see notes 22 & 26 supra.
58. 430 A.2d at 786-87. For a discussion of "strike suits," see note 26
supra.
59. 430 A.2d at 787. The court opined that such a limited inquiry would
not be sufficient to prevent abuse of the committee dismisal technique by
directors who are called upon to judge their fellow directors. The court
emphasized the fact that the committee mechanism requires directors to pass
judgment on fellow directors who had appointed them to the board and that
in such a situation empathy for the director-defendants would be natural. Id.
For a discussion of cases applying the business judgment rule to a committee's
decision to cause dismissal of derivative litigation, see notes 30 & 32-47 and
accompanying text supra.
60. 430 A.2d at 788. Further, the court stated that the litigating stockholder is entitled to "strict court review" and should not be precluded from
obtaining a decision on the merits because of a concern for practicality or
judicial economy. The Zapata court noted that review by the lower court of
"ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee relations, fiscal
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The court concluded that when, on the advice of an independent
committee of the board, the corporation moves to dismiss a derivative
suit as detrimental to its best interests, the corporation bears the burden
of proving the independence and good faith of the committee members
and the adequacy of the bases supporting their conclusions.61 Limited
discovery will be permitted for this inquiry and if this burden is not
met, the court must deny the motion. 62 Once independence and good
faith are established, the court must proceed to apply its own independent business judgment to the decision to terminate the litigation,
giving consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to
the best interests of the corporation, and should "weigh how compelling
the corporate interest in dismissal is when faced with a non-frivolous
lawsuit." 63

It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Delaware's decision in
Zapata preserves the derivative suit as an effective means of redressing
breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate management. 64 In looking be[and] legal" factors is not beyond its competence, as the Court of Chancery
regularly "deals with fiduciary relationships, disposition of trust property,
approval of settlements and scores of similar problems."
Id., quoting
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Compare Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926
(courts are "ill equipped" to evaluate business judgments). For a discussion of
Auerbach, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.

The court acknowledged that Zapata's alternative motion for dismissal or
summary judgment was a hybrid and not easily characterized, but found that
what the corporation sought was somewhat analogous to the settlement of
derivative litigation wherein the court is called on to exercise its own business
judgment in determining whether to approve a proposed settlement. 430 A.2d
at 787. For a discussion of the trial court's role in the settlement of derivative
litigation, see note 19 supra.

61. 430 A.2d at 788.

The court stated: "The motion should include a

thorough record of the investigation and its findings and recommendations."
Id.
62. Id. at 788-89. Discovery would facilitate inquiry into the independence
of the committee members and the adequacy of the bases for their conclusions.
Id. at 788.

63. Id. The court explained that the application of the lower court's
business judgment is intended to correct situations where, though the committee has been found to have been independent and to have conducted a
reasonable investigation, the motion to dismiss would appear not to be in
keeping with the "spirit" of those requirements. Id. Compare Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928 (restriction
of the court's inquiry to the independence of the directors and sufficiency of
their investigation is a necessary corollary of the board's managerial authority).
For a discussion of Auerbach, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
64. For a discussion of the purposes of the derivative suit, see Dent, supra
note 14, at 109; note 22 supra. See generally Dykstra, supra note 12.

In Zapata the acceleration of the option exercise date resulted in a tax

saving to the optionee-directors and a loss of the corresponding tax deduction
to the corporation. See note 3 supra. This situation should be contrasted
with the questionable foreign payments cases wherein the payments were not
made to benefit the directors and were arguably made to further the corpora.
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hind the committee's decision, the Zapata court addressed the question
of whether directors can use the power to delegate decision making
authority to an "independent committee" to shield their own alleged
acts of self-interest from shareholder challenge and judicial scrutiny. 65
This question must be answered in the negative. It is necessary that
the court apply its independent business judgment to a committee's
decision to dismiss litigation in order to prevent the alleged wrongdoers
66
from simply selecting their own judge and jury.
Further, it is submitted that, in concluding that an application of
the business judgment rule to the committee's decision would not be
sufficient to prevent the abuse of authority by corporate directors, the
Zapata court's opinion is consistent with the spirit of prior Delaware
case law. 67 Even where statutory requirements have been complied with,
tion's interests. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Gall v. Exxon, 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). Two courts have granted committee generated motions to
dismiss where the underlying wrongdoing was an alleged breach of duty of
loyalty. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 869 (1980); Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982).
65. It is submitted that actions taken by directors to benefit their fellows
at the expense of the corporation should be treated as breaches of the duty of
loyalty just as are actions taken by the directors for their own benefit since in
neither case is the good of the corporation the paramount concern. For a
discussion of the duty of loyalty, see note 14 supra. While not reaching this
issue, the Vice Chancellor noted that the acceleration of the option might not
be entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule because of the
directors' "personal interest" in the matter. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1251, 1259 (Del. Ch. 1980). On the facts of Zapata it is clear that when three
of the optionee directors did not attend the meeting at which the option
acceleration was voted, the five attending directors became a quorum. The
fourth optionee director abstained, so that the four non-optionee directors,
who were a majority of the quorum, although not a majority of the full board,
could approve the option acceleration. These actions on the part of the
directors relieved the option holders from the necessity of voting for the option
themselves while allowing them to benefit from the votes of their non-optionee
fellows. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032, 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
notes 2 &c3 supra. For a discussion of the application of the business judgment
rule, see notes 16-21 and accompanying text supra.
66. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980). The
Delaware Supreme Court quoted the Vice Chancellor below with approval:
"Under our system of law, courts and not litigants should decide the merits
of litigation." 430 A.2d at 789 n.18, quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
at 1263. See also note 59 supra.
67. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) ("it is within
the responsibility of an equity court to scrutinize a corporate act when it is
alleged that its purpose violates the fiduciary duty owed to minority stockholders"); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (nothing in the

interested director transaction statute sanctions unfairness or removes such a
transaction from judicial scrutiny); Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A.
277 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (a shareholder may conduct derivative litigation when
"material corporate rights would not otherwise be protected"); McKee v.
Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, 156 A. 191 (Ch. 1931) (stockholder may sue on behalf
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Delaware courts have inquired into the fairness of transactions between
a corporation and those in control.0 8 This is analogous to the instant
case, where, although the directors recommending dismissal constituted
a committee authorized by statute and were found to be independent of
the wrongdoers and to have conducted a reasonable investigation, the
court retained the power to scrutinize the substance of the decision.
Zapata is therefore consistent with cases such as Singer v. Magnovox 69
and Fliegler v. Lawrence 70 in its conclusion that it is well within the

expertise of the courts to scrutinize actions taken by management in
order to determine whether they are intrinsically fair to the corporation.
In essence, the import of Zapata is that the trial court, in applying
its independent business judgment to determine whether it is in the best
interests of the corporation and the public to terminate the litigation,
will scrutinize the underlying allegedly wrongful actions of the directors
to determine whether those actions are entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule.7 1
of corporation when the corporate management would not be proper party to
conduct the litigation). While Sohland v. Baker does not support the Vice
Chancellor's holding in Maldonado, that a stockholder has an absolute right to
conduct derivative litigation over the corporation's objection, it does support
the Supreme Court's conclusion that where demand is excused the litigating
stockholder is entitled to "strict [c]ourt review" before the suit can be dismissed.
See 430 A.2d at 788. See also Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del.
Ch. 1980); notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
Sohland v. Baker, see notes 23 & 51 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Fliegler v. Lawrence, see note 14 supra and notes 68 8C 70 and
accompanying text infra.
68. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977). The
court in Singer stated:
[A] Delaware court will not be indifferent to the purpose of a merger
when a freeze-out of minority stockholders . . . is alleged to be its
sole purpose. In such a situation, if it alleged that the purpose is
improper because of the fiduciary obligation owed to the minority,
the court is duty bound to closely examine that allegation even when
all of the relevant statutory forms have been satisfied.
See also Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (compliance with interested director statute does not remove transaction from judicial scrutiny for
fairness).
69. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). For a discussion of Singer v. Magnavox, see
notes 67 &c68 and accompanying text supra.
70. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976). For a discussion of Fliegler v. Lawrence, see
notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text supra. Compare Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (courts are "ill
equipped" to evaluate business judgments). For a discussion of Auerbach, see
notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
71. Where the challenged actions involve breaches of fiduciary duty,
directors may not invoke the business judgment rule, therefore, the Zapata
court's decision is simply a return to the way courts functioned prior to the
development of the committee dismissal technique, when faced with derivative
litigation brought to redress wrongs allegedly committed by management. For
a discussion of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care, see notes 14 & 15
supra. Merely by the resignation of some of the alleged wrongdoers or by the
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Further, as a result of the Zapata court's conclusion that the court's
independent business judgment will be applied only in cases where demand has been excused,72 the characterization of demand as excusable
becomes important.73 However, since the Zapata court's decision would
require that a court begin its scrutiny of the substance of the committee's
decision with a determination of whether there is merit in the plaintiff's
allegation that a majority of the board members have breached their
fiduciary duties to the corporation, the problem of "manufactured"
pleadings against all or a majority of the directors for the purpose of
74
having demand excused will be obviated.
expansion of the size of the board of directors and the filling of the resulting
vacancies with "independent" directors to form a committee to decide the fate
of the litigation, management should not relieve itself of the burden of showing

the court that foregoing suit would benefit the corporation and not be detri-

mental to the public interest.

72. 430 A.2d at 784. The Zapata court noted that "when stockholders,
after making demand and having their suit rejected, attack the board's decision
as improper, the board's decision falls under the 'business judgment' rule and
will be respected if [not wrongful]." Id. at 784 n.10. For a discussion of
wrongful refusal, see note 28 and accompanying text supra.

73. For a discussion of the grounds for excuse of demand, see note 29

supra. If the court finds that a majority of the directors were neither wrongdoers nor acted under the control of the wrongdoers the plaintiff must make
demand on the board. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra. See also
Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1980) (where fewer than a
majority of the directors were accused of wrongdoing, demand was required).
Once demand is found to be excused, it is suggested that the creation of an
independent committee, either before or after the initiation of the suit, should
not vitiate that excuse. Contra Seigal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106, 110 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (demand is not excusable where the board can create an independent
committee). The Auerbach decision, in effect, has eliminated any exceptions
to the demand requirement in New York. See Note, supra note 29 at 564;
notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra. This would not be consistent with
the Zapata court's emphasis on the plaintiff's right to bring suit when the
board itself is disqualified. Excusing demand "saves the plaintiff the expense
and delay of making a futile demand resulting in a probable tainted exercise
of . . . authority in a refusal by the board or in giving control of the litigation
to the opposing side." 430 A.2d at 786. The creation of an independent investigation committee does not change the underlying disqualification of the
board's majority on which the claim of excuse rests. Where, however, demand
is required and is refused the plaintiff's burden will be to show that the refusal
was wrongful. See note 28 and accompanying text supra. By alleging a
wrongful refusal, the plaintiff will be able to invoke a judicial forum for the
determination of the wrongfulness of the refusal. Therefore, it is submitted
that even where demand is required, the board, merely by creating an independent investigation committee, will not be able to shield its activities from
the court. Further, since the court has acknowledged its duty to consider
questions of public policy in ruling on motions to dismiss derivative litigation
where demand has been excused, it is suggested that the court may also be
duty bound to consider public policy when the board has refused a demand
to initiate the litigation. See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
74. See Dent, supra note 14, at 140-42. As expressed by Dent:
Courts may be justly reluctant to allow bare allegations to circumvent
the requirement of a demand on the board because compliance with
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The greatest impact of the instant decision is that the management
of Delaware corporations will not be able to avoid judicial scrutiny of a
shareholder's allegation that a majority of the board of directors breached
their fiduciary duties to the corporation. 7 Questions concerning public
policy, legality and fiscal reality 76 can only be answered by a careful
study of the plaintiff's allegations and the committee's findings, 77 making it necessary for a court to consider the merits of the case in order
to properly evaluate the corporation's motion to dismiss. In light of
these conclusions, it is suggested that if Delaware corporations continue
to appoint independent investigative committees it will only be in an
effort to assure the courts that management has conducted a proper
78
investigation of the alleged wrongdoing.
Leah Levine Tompkins

the requirement is so easy, but the effect of a refusal to sue raises
more serious problems. Although accepting at face value the plaintiff's allegations of dominion or of collusion, approval or acquiescence
by the board may lead to abuses, this seems preferable to dismissing
what may be meritorious claims, thereby negating important shareholder rights ...
Id. at 142.
75. See note 73 supra.
76. See note 60 supra.
77. See notes 61 & 62 supra. By allowing discovery the court will ensure
that pertinent facts concerning the litigation will be uncovered. "Full discovery is vital to the development of any case against corporate directors, and
the inability of disinterested directors to compel testimony or the production
of documents raises a suspicion that their investigation may not adequately
protect the interests of shareholders, even where the directors proceed energetically." Dent, supra note 14, at 120.
78. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
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